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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v

:

AHAB MUSTAPHA ALY,

:

Case No. 880488-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of exploiting
prostitution in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1)(b)
(1978), a third degree felony, following a jury trial in Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard
H. Russon, judge, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction of this

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court's refusal to give

defendant's requested jury instruction, No. 13, which limited the
introduction of the State's witness' prior felony conviction to
being considered for purposes of credibility only, was reversible
error.
2.

Whether the trial court improperly limited defense

counsel's closing argument by preventing defense counsel from
arguing that the prosecution's failure to call a witness that may

have corroborated the State's witness served to cast doubt on the
State's case.
3.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict

defendant of exploiting prostitution.
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (1978).

Exploiting

prostitution.
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting
prostitution if he:
(b) Encourages, induces, or otherwise
purposely causes another to become or remain
a prostitute . . . .
Utah R. Evid. 609(a) t
General rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Utah R. Evid. 403;
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudiceir
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ahab Mustapha Aly, was charged with
exploiting prostitution in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-101305 (1978).

He was convicted as charged following a jury trial.
-2-

The trial court stayed the statutory term of imprisonment of zero
to five years and placed defendant on probation for eighteen
months; he was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and serve ten days in
the Salt Lake County Jail with work release.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In August 1987, Carmen Dena Finken was unemployed and
looking for work (T. A-15).

She located a help wanted ad in a

newspaper that advertised a position as an escort at which she
could make $45 an hour (T. A-15).

She called and made an

appointment to go in the next day, at which time she met with
defendant, Ahab Aly (T. A-16).

Defendant filled her in on the

job requirements, which included meeting with men for an hour as
she modeled lingerie and swimwear; she was informed that the
escorts must obey laws and refrain from touching private areas,
which were defined as anything covered by a swimsuit (T. A-17).
Ms. Finken was informed that she would earn $45 an hour (T. A17).

Ms. Finken did not anticipate having to engage in sexual

behavior with the clients; in fact, defendant told her
specifically that she would not have to (T. A-36).

Later she was

informed that there were certain customers for whom she was
expected to do anything they wanted (T. A-36).
When Ms. Finken initially got the job, she stayed with
defendant at his home (T. A-25).

She had been living in Layton

The transcript of this case is coontained in one volume that is
separated into three parts. The pages in each part begin with
page number 1. The transcript cites herein will refer to the
June 2nd transcript as MA," the June 3rd transcript as "B#M and
the July 18th transcript as ,,C.,, The page number will then
follow the part designation, e.g., M(T. A-l)" for June 2
transcript at page 1.
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and had no transportation to Salt Lake City (T. A-25).

She

engaged in sex with defendant; initially she did so voluntarily
but also stated that defendant told her she was expected to sleep
with him (T. A-25).
Ms. Finken detailed four incidents in which she met
with men.

On the first "date," she went to an office building

downtown where she met with a businessman (T. A-18).

He removed

his clothes and asked her to model the lingerie (T. A-18).

The

man began to masturbate and then asked her to masturbate him; she
refused, saying it was against the law, but he grabbed her hand
and forced her (T. A-19).

She was paid $100 and turned the money

over to defendant (T. A-22).

Ms. Finken related what had

happened, and defendant said that it was "expected" of any escort
who saw this client (T. A-22-23).

Defendant informed her that

there were customers who were "special" and that certain favors
were expected (T. A-23-24).

He also warned her several times to

make sure the customers were not cops (T. A-24).
On a second date a few days later, Ms. Finken met a man
at a motel who was wearing only underwear.

She modeled the

lingerie while the client masturbated (T. A-26).

He had her lay

on the bed with him while he rubbed his penis between her legs
until he ejaculated (T. A-26).

She was paid $100; defendant got

$55 and she kept $45 (T. A-29).

She later told defendant that

the man was disgusting, to which defendant replied, MWell# that
is something you just have to put up with" because he was a
"special customer" (T. A-28).

-4-

On a third date, Ms. Finken met a man at the Roadrunner
Motel.

The client, who was initially in a wheelchair, lay on the

bed with her as kissed and hugged her and rubbed his penis
against her (T. A-30).

He extended her stay an additional hour

and paid her by check (T. A-29-30).

When she returned, she told

defendant he was just like everyone else, to which defendant
replied that the situation was not unusual (T. A-31-32).
Prior to a fourth date a few days later, defendant told
Ms. Finken that the client was a good friend and was "special"
and that she was to do whatever he wanted (T. A-33).

Defendant

dropped her off at the client's house in the avenues area.
man was intoxicated and wearing a bathrobe (T. A-34).

The

She

modeled the lingerie, laid on the bed with him, and they hugged
and kissed (T. A-34).

After the hour visit, defendant picked her

up and took her back to his place (T. A-34).

Defendant kept the

entire $100 she was paid, saying that he was keeping her share to
pay for part of her escort license (T. A-35).
On cross-examination, Ms. Finken stated that she had
been convicted of felony distribution of a controlled substance
in August 1986 (T. 39). She had been placed on probation; she
was found to be in violation of her probation as a result of
working for defendant as an escort as well as for non-payment of
a fine (T. A-36-37).
Ms. Finken was cross-examined about the details of a
statement she had been a detective in October 1987 (R. A-46).
Some of the statements were different than her trial testimony;
she had told the detective that she had not complained to

-5-

defendant about the clients' conduct because complaints to
defendant were strictly taboo (T. A-58).

Also, she only gave

details about the first date and told the detective there had
been no other sexual activity (T. A-63).

She explained that

since her statement to the detective, she had had a chance to
reflect on the incident and reiterated that she had complained to
defendant about each incident (T. A-64).

She also explained that

she had interpreted sexual activity to be limited to sexual
intercourse (T. A-65).
Defendant did not testify or present evidence at trial
(T. A-70).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that the
State's witnesses' credibility could be impeached as the result
of a prior conviction was not error, as the jury was free to
consider the prior conviction for any purpose—not just
credibility—and the jury was instructed generally about
determining the credibility of witnesses.
Defendant failed to establish that a potential witness
was peculiarly within the power of the State to produce as a
witness or that her testimony would elucidate the issues at
trial, and was, therefore, not entitled to argue the missing
witness inference.
The evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of exploiting prostitution.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF A
WITNESS WHO HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF
A FELONY WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Defendant contends that Utah R. Evid 609(a) does not
afford the same protection to government witnesses as it does to
a defendant and defense witnesses, and that, therefore, the
State's witnesses, Ms. Finken, was subject to impeachment as the
result of her prior conviction for felony distribution of a
controlled substance.

Although Ms. Finken testified on cross-

examination that she had been convicted of this felony, thus
putting the evidence before the jury, defendant claims it was
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the
jury that their consideration of the conviction was limited to
its effect on the credibility of Ms. Finken.
Utah R. Evid. 609(a) states:
General rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
During cross-examination, Ms. Finken admitted that she
had been previously convicted for felony distribution of a
controlled substance in Davis County in August 1986 (T A-39).
Consequently, the jury was informed of Ms. Finken's prior
-7-

criminal conviction.

Defendant contends that Rule 609(a) permits

the use of prior felony convictions to impeach a State's witness
in all criminal cases, and that the balancing test contained in
subsection (a)(1) applies only when determining the prejudicial
effect to the defendant.
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court has
considered whether Rule 609(a) affords no protection to State's
witnesses in criminal cases, which would allow unfettered use of
prior convictions regardless of the probative value to the
witnesses' credibility or the remoteness in time that the
conviction was entered.

Therefore, the issue has yet to be

resolved in this jurisdiction.
As defendant correctly points out, in State v. Banner,
717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the
rules of evidence adopted in 1983 were to provide a fresh
starting place for the law of evidence and that the courts should
look to the federal rules for guidance in construing the new
rules.

It appears that the majority position in the federal

courts is that the process of weighing the probative value of
evidence of a prior conviction against the prejudicial effect "to
the defendant," places no limitation upon cross-examination of
government witnesses because of possible prejudicial effect to
them.

See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.

1977); United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 847 (19

); United States v. Thorne, 547

F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
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Other jurisdictions have not followed this position.
For example, in People v. Woodard, 590 P.2d 391, 396 (Cal. 1979),
the California Supreme Court held that a trial court must weigh
appropriate factors to determine whether the probative value of a
prior conviction for purposes of credibility is outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice.

The court noted that "'[i]t would be

anomalous to hold that a trial judge has no discretion to exclude
evidence that a witness, other than a defendant in a criminal
action, was convicted of a felony even though the felony was, for
example, an aggravated assault committed many years earlier when
the witness was young and immature.'"

(Citations omitted.

To allow otherwise could lead to an unsettling result
in a number of situations.

For example, there may be cases in

which the case hinges on the credibility of a defendant weighed
against the credibility of a state's witness.

If a defendant who

has numerous convictions chooses to testify, but none of the
convictions are admissible when analyzing the probative value
against prejudicial effect as affecting credibility, the
defendant will appear more credible than a government witness who
may have had one prior conviction for a relatively minor offense.
This would lead the jury to underestimate the credibility of the
state's witness when juxtaposed to the defendant's credibility
because of incomplete or distorted information.
Regardless, the issue in this case is not whether Ms.
Finken's prior conviction was admissible—the evidence was
admitted in this case.

The jury was informed that she had been

previously convicted of felony distribution of a controlled
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substance.

The issue here is whether the jury should have been

given defendant's proposed instruction No. 13. The proposed
instruction states:
The testimony of a witness may be
discredited or impeached by showing that the
witness has been convicted of a felony, that
is, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term of years. Prior conviction does not
render a witness incompetent to testify, but
is merely a circumstance which you may
consider in determining the credibility of
the witness. It is the province of the jury
to determine the weight to be given to any
prior conviction as impeachment.
(R. 61.)
The requested instruction is essentially a limiting or
cautionary instruction, which informs the jury that the prior
conviction should be considered only for purposes of a witness'
credibility.

Failure to give the instruction did not prejudice

defendant because, absent the instruction, the jury was allowed
to consider the prior conviction for any purpose.

For example,

the jury was free to infer that Ms. Finken was a person of bad
character or morals as the result of her prior conviction.
The trial court ruled that Ms. Finken's prior
conviction was not admissible.

His ruling was apparently based

on Utah R. Evid 609(a), as he stated that the majority position
is that the crime of distribution of a controlled substance is
not a crime involving the honesty of a witness (T. B-2-3).

The

court stated that had the State objected at the time the evidence
was admitted, he would have sustained the objection (T. B-2).
Apparently, the court found that the conviction for distribution
of a controlled substance did not weigh heavily on the
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credibility of Ms. Finken.

Even if the evidence could have been

admitted under Rule 609(a), the trial court was free to find the
evidence inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 403.
v. Dixon,

547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).

See United States

Rule 403 states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Even if evidence is proper impeachment evidence, it can
be excluded because its potential for prejudice outweighs its
probative value under some circumstances.
721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).

See State v. Rammell,

A trial court's determination of such

an issue will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court so
abused its discretion that there was a substantial likelihood of
an unjust result.

See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah

1982) .
Further, failure to give the instruction did not
prejudice defendant as the jury was instructed in instructions
No. 9 and 9 as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
Where there is a conflict in the
evidence you should reconcile such conflict
as far as you reasonably can. . . . You are
not bound to believe all that the witnesses
have testified to or any witness or class of
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable
and convincing in view of all of the facts
and circumstances in evidence. . . . The
testimony of a witness known to have made
false statements on one matter is naturally
less convincing on other matters. So if you
believe a witness has wilfully testified
falsely as to any material fact in this case,
you may disregard the whole of the testimony
-11-

of such witness, or you may give it such
weight as you think it is entitled to.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
You are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witness and the weight of
the evidence. In judging the weight of the
testimony and credibility of the witnesses
you have a right to take into consideration
their bias, their interest in the result of
the suit, or any probable motive or lack
thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown.
You may consider the witnesses' deportment
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of
their statements, their apparent frankness or
candor, or the want of it, their opportunity
to know, their ability to understand, and
their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters together with all of
the other facts and circumstances which you
may believe have a bearing on the
truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses'
statement.
Given that the jury was instructed on how it should
determine the credibility of witnesses and specifically informed
that it could consider enumerated items as well as "any other
facts and circumstances which you may believe have a bearing on
the truthfulness" of a witnesses' testimony, the jury was
adequately informed on this issue and it was not error for the
trial court to refuse to give defendant's requested instruction
No. 13.

Jury instructions must be considered as a whole.

v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984).

State

Whether to give

instructions is generally left to the discretion of the trial
court, and it is not error to refuse an instruction if its
content is set out in other instructions.

State v. Reedy, 681

P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984) .
Finally, it appears that defendant's requested
instruction was not timely.

According to the judge's hand
-1 ?-

written note on instruction No. 13, the instruction was received
on the last day of trial (R. 61). An instruction that is not
timely submitted need not be given.

State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566

(Utah 1983) .
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A
POTENTIAL WITNESS WAS PECULIARLY WITHIN THE
POWER OF THE STATE TO PRODUCE AND, THEREFORE,
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ARGUE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
THAT THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO CALL THIS
WITNESS CAST DOUBT ON THE STATE'S CASE.
Defendant contends that it was reversible error for the
trial court to restrict his closing argument and prevent him from
arguing that the State's failure to call Sheri Mitchell as a
corroborating witness raised doubt as to its case.

Defendant

contends that there was one conversation between Ms. Finken and
defendant during which Sheri Mitchell was present, and that Ms.
Finken made statements during the conversation that were
inconsistent with her statement to the investigating detective.
Specifically, Ms. Finken testified about having informed
defendant after her first date that a client had requested sexual
favors, and that she did so in the presence of Sheri Mitchell,
but then told the detective during an interview that she did not
inform defendant that the clients had expected sex.
To prevail on this argument, defendant must show that
the witness, Sheri Mitchell, was peculiarly within the power of
the State to produce.

Defendant must have demonstrate that the

witness was "physically available only to the opponent, or that
the witness has the type of relationship with the opposing party
that pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the
-13-

opposing party.

State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985).

In

Smith, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the "missing witness"
inference, stating that the concept:
has been judicially recognized for over a
century and has been summarized as follows:
"If a party has it peculiarly within his
power to produce witnesses whose testimony
would elucidate the transaction, the fact
that he does not do it permits an inference
that the testimony, if produced, would have
been unfavorable."
Id. at 1057.

(Citations omitted.)

In Smith the record did not

demonstrate that the "missing witnesses" were peculiarly within
the power of the state to produce as witnesses.

They were not

involved in the case, and the defendant "elicited no shread of
evidence to prove that their testimony was unavailable" to him.
Id. at 1058.

The Court held that the defendant's argument was

properly limited because the conditions necessary for the comment
were lacking.
In the present case, the conditions necessary for
comment on Ms. Mitchell's absence are similarly lacking.
Defendant was aware that Ms. Finken had a roommate and was even
aware of her first name (T. B-4). He claimed, however, that he
did not have access to her or know where or who she was (T. B-4).
The prosecutor stated that had defense counsel asked, the State
would have made Ms. Finken or the witness available to him (T. B4).

Although arrangements could have been made after the first

day of trial, when this allegedly important information came to
light, defense counsel made no request for more information about
the witness, and did not move for a continuance to allow time to
obtain further information.
-14-

Defendant did not show that the witness was peculiarly
within the power of the State to produce as a witness, or that
her testimony would have been elucidating.

Had defendant in fact

desired the testimony of Ms. Mitchell, he could have made a
request for more information and she would have been made
available.

Further, it is just as likely as not that the

testimony of Ms. Mitchell would not have served to elucidate the
issues.

Defendant did not show that she was in a position to

perceive and recall the statements made by Ms. Finken or that her
statements would have served to inform the jury.

It is as likely

as not that her statements would have served to reinforce the
testimony of Ms. Finken.
Because defendant did not adequately preserve the
record in this case by demonstrating either that the witness was
peculiarly within the power of the State to produce or that the
testimony would serve to elucidate the transaction, his argument
must fail.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
establish his guilt of exploiting prostitution.

The standard of

review has previously been defined by this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court for claims of insufficiency of the evidence. An
appellate court accords great deference to the jury verdict.

It

is exclusively the function of the jury to weigh the evidence and
determine the credibility of the witnesses.

"The Court should

only interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
-15-

that reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412

(Utah App. 1987), quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah
1980) .
The defendant has the burden of establishing "that the
evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that th€> defendant
committed the crime."

State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah

1985), quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).
All evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence
should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict.

When the evidence is so viewed, the Court reverses only

when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
concerning the defendant's guilt.

State v. One 1982 Silver Honda

Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987), citing State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).

This Court has succinctly

stated that unless there is a clear showing of a lack of
evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.
412.

Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at

See also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1977).
A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he

•'[e]ncourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to
become or remain a prostitute . . . ."
1305(1)(b) (1978).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-

A person engages in prostitution when the

person "engages or offers or agrees to engage in any sexual
activity with another for a fee."
1302(1)(a) (1978).

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-

Sexual activity includes "masturbation,

sexual intercourse, or any sexual act involving the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless of
the sex of either participant."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4)

(Supp. 1987) .
Ms. Finken was employed by defendant at Aziza Escorts
(T. A-17).

She was told initially that she was not to engage in

illegal behavior, which included touching of private areas (T. A17).

Ms. Finken described the details of four incidents in which

she engaged in sexual activity with men.

The first incident

involved meeting a businessman at his office where she modeled
lingerie for him and he required her to masturbate him (T. A-1819).

The second incident involved meeting a man at a motel; he

had her lay on the bed with him while he rubbed his penis between
her legs until he ejaculated (T. A-26).

The third incident was

again at a motel room where the wheelchair bound client had her
lay with him on the bed while he touched her and rubbed his
genitals against her (T. A29-30).

The fourth incident she

described involved going to a client's home in the avenues where
she modeled lingerie for an intoxicated man and then lay with him
on the bed where they engaged in hugging and kissing (T. A-3334).
Each time Ms. Finken returned to defendant's home, she
informed him of what had occurred (T. A-22-24, 27, 31-32).

In

response, he told her that the customers were "special" and that
this type of behavior on her part was "expected."

Of the $100

per hour that Ms. Finken earned, defendant kept $55; on some
occasions, he kept the entire amount ostensibly to pay for her
escort license (T. A-22, 29-30, 35).
-17-

The only evidence in contravention to Ms. Finken's
testimony was elicited during cross-examination during which she
admitted that in a statement to the detective she had made a few
statements that were inconsistent with her trial testimony.
Specifically, she stated that she had not complained to defendant
about the sexual activity involved because complaints to
defendant were taboo (T. A-58).

She also related only the

details of the first incident, and said there was no other sexual
activity (T. A-63).
However, Ms. Finken stated that she had had time to
reflect upon the incident since her statement to Detective
Campbell (T. A-64).

She stated that her trial testimony given

under oath was the truth, and that she had indeed complained to
and informed defendant of the sexual activity requested by the
clients but defendant informed her that the clients were special
and that she was required to do what they pleased (T. A-64).
When applying the standard of review in this case, it
is clear that the evidence was sufficient to establish
defendant's guilt of exploiting prostitution.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Ahab Mustapha Aly, was properly
convicted of exploiting prostitution.

For the foregoing reasons

and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State
of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
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